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Hazard, Jr. Geoffrey
Preclusion as to Issues of Law:
The Legal System's Interest
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. *
The rules of claim and issue preclusion bar litigants from relitigating
claims and issues, except under narrowly defined circumstances. The
parties' alignment of interest in application of the rules of preclusion is
generally simple and direct, even brutal. The winner in the former litiga-
tion does not want to permit the claim or issue to be relitigated. The loser
wants the matters in question to be considered anew. But there are ex-
ceptions to this alignment. One notable example is where a judgment win-
ner has won less than he sought and wants what has been inelegantly but
expressively called "two bites at the cherry."' In general, however, the
prior winner wants the door closed and the loser wants it open.
There is also a third participant in the controversy. This is the court,
or more inclusively, the judicial system, and still more inclusively, the
legal system. The judicial system has a strong although not unequivocal
interest in seeing that things judicially decided-res judicata-stay decided.
The immediate interest underlying this position is often said to be
efficiency-that redoing that which has been done is a waste of time and
effort. 2 No doubt efficiency considerations are vitally important in the rules
of res judicata. However, it might well be more expedient to try most
types of cases by a "quick and dirty" procedure and then liberally permit
motions for retrial on the basis of surprise, newly obtained evidence, or
serious doubt as to veracity of key witnesses. In fact, procedure in trial
courts of limited jurisdiction previously followed such a model. In those
courts, trial was brief and informal but a new trial was available of right
by appeal to the trial court of general jurisdiction. 3 Essentially the same
mechanism has emerged in the form of the "mini-trial" and similar
streamlined techniques of dispute resolution. 4 Moreover, even when a full
* Nathan Baker Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A. 1953, Swarthmore College;
LL.B. 1954, Columbia University.
1. The general rule is that such a winner is not entitled to two bites. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 18 (1982) ("When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered
in favor of the plaintiff: (1) The plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original
claim or any part thereof ....").
2. See id. introduction at 6-12.
3. See generally LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF COURT ORGANIZATION 4-5, table at 43 (1973).
4. See generally, e.g., L. FARMER, APPEALS EXPEDITING SYSTEMS: AN EVALUATION OF
SECOND AND EIGHTH CIRCUIT PROCEDURES (Federal Judicial Center 1981); M. JACOUBOVITCH
& C. MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO (Federal Judical
Center 1982); A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN
THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1981).
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and costly trial has been held, the law of res judicata has always had room
for a motion to set aside where the showing is strong and the apparent
injustice great.
Hence, efficiency is not an exhaustive justification for the rules of
claim and issue preclusion. Indeed, it probably is not the fundamental
justification. The fundamental justifications for the preclusion rules are
epistemological and institutional in nature.
As a matter of epistemology, a court cannot decide what the disputed
facts "are," nor can it finally fix what the law "is." The facts in a legal
dispute usually are past events that, having occurred in their own time
and circumstance, now are eclipsed by succeeding events and exist only
in partial and partisan memories. When an injunction is under considera-
tion, the relevant events are prospective and in a strict sense wholly im-
aginary. A court therefore does not "find" facts. It postulates them by
an official process-a trial, in which the legal system pronounces on the
basis of imperfect evidence what will be considered perfect truth. The
transformation from indeterminacy to certainty is presented as empirical
inquiry and discovery, and indeed, a trial involves both inquiry and
discovery. But the transformation into certainty also entails an unavoidable
element of official fiat and thus an institutional and political element. The
facts are as the court says they are. The ultimate reason why the court's
ipse dixit prevails is because the pronouncement is ex officio and the political
sovereign has said through organic law that judicial pronouncements shall
prevail.
As for issues of law, judicial pronouncements also are conclusive
because by a second order rule they are pronounced to be conclusive. 5
In a sense, to which Holmes adverted, 6 rules of law do not "exist" but
are only forecasts of the terms in which the power of the state will be brought
to bear if push comes to shove. In a strict chronological or existential sense,
the law that "is" when a transaction occurs is not the same law that "is"
when the transaction is sued on, or the same law that "is" when the suit
goes to judgment. For many reasons, however, it is useful, indeed in-
stitutionally vital, to ignore these discontinuities. It is morally intolerable
that the incidence of the state's authority appears to depend simply on
the date at which it is exercised. Therefore, the social order undertakes
to say that rules of law exist intertemporally-that the law has been, is,
and shall continue to be-and that the rules will be consistently applied
regardless of the temporal sequence of events. The considerations under-
lying this policy are maintenance of equality before the law and the social
stability that such equality promotes.
5. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAWV 138-39 (1961).
6. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897) ("The pro-
phecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law.").
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The legal system has a complex apparatus to carry out this ultimately
political purpose of maintaining consistency in what the law "is." The
purpose is reflected in the very idea of a statute. 7 The doctrine of stare
decisis also is part of the apparatus. So is the technique of "harmoniz-
ing" decisional authorities and reconciling statutory provisions whose literal
meanings are inconsistent." The law of the case doctrine is another
subsidiary.9
Another important part of the apparatus is found in the rules of res
judicata. As we often have been reminded by our highest court, the rules
of res judicata express strong public policy in favor of stability of decisions.10
But there are exceptions to these rules and therefore qualifications to the
policy that supports them. The present inquiry examines one of these ex-
ceptions from a special viewpoint. The viewpoint is that of the judicial
system as an institution, rather than the viewpoint either of the litigants
or of a court confronting whether relitigation of a particular claim or a
particular issue should be allowed. The proposition is that concern for
equality and stability external to the specific controversy may justify the
courts in sometimes sacrificing equality and stability as between the im-
mediate parties. That is, larger institutional concerns may prevail over
narrower ones.
I. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF CLAIM PRECLUSION
The general rule of claim preclusion prohibits a plaintiff who has gone
to final judgment from further seeking relief against the defendant. II But
this rule is subject to exceptions. Some of these exceptions estop litigants
from invoking claim preclusion; 12 others arise where procedural limita-
tions made it impossible or impractical to litigate the whole transaction
in one instance.1 3
Two other exceptions should be considered. These are defined in
Restatement (Second) ofJudgments § 26(1)(d): "The judgment in the first action
was plainly inconsistent with the fair and equitable implementation of a
7. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 74-75 (1982).
8. Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 522-28
app. C (1960) (listing "canons" of statutory construction).
9. See Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 1, 1.
10. E.g., Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981); Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 370-71 (1877) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (1982); see also id. § 24(1) ( "When
a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim
.... the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction out of which the action
arose.").
12. See id. § 26(1)(a) (agreement between the parties to split the action); id. § 26(1)(b)
(action split by court order).
13. See id. § 26(1)(c) (procedural limitations in first action); id. § 26(1)(e) (continuing
wrong treated as multiple wrongs that are subject to successive actions).
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statutory or constitutional scheme, or it is the sense of the scheme that
the plaintiff should be permitted to split his claim." ' 14
The exception embodied in the last clause of section 26(l)(d) refers
to established procedural policy, originating from a specific statutory
scheme. But the first clause-"inconsistent with the fair and equitable
implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme"-is something
else again. This exception is best exemplified in the Restatement by illustration
6 to section 26.
In illustration 6, black students and parents sue the board of educa-
tion to invalidate and enjoin the operation of a state tuition grant law.
The court rejects the claim that the law fosters racial discrimination and
holds it constitutional as applied. The state of the law does not warrant
an appeal and one is not taken. In a separate and subsequent case the
United States Supreme Court invalidates as unconstitutional a similar
tuition grant law of another state. A second action by the black students
and parents will be allowed. The justification provided by the Restatement
is that "[i]n a matter of such public importance the policy of nationwide
adherence to the authoritative constitutional interpretation overcomes the
policies supporting the law of res judicata." ' '1 5
A crucial theme is reflected in this illustration. It involves, first of
all, an inequality of legal treatment among similarly situated persons. This
inequality is evident because we refuse to regard the adjudication in the
first action as conclusive of the legal position of the parties. If we assumed
that the adjudication was conclusive, we would have to say that the ine-
quality was a simple blunder in the administration of justice or that there
were some latent distinguishing characteristics of the parties to the first
litigation that justified their being treated differently from those in the
second litigation. But we "know" that neither of these explanations is
correct. We know this because we can stand outside the system of ad-
judication, free from the proposition that things adjudicated must be as
the court has said them to be. When we stand in that position, we realize
that something is involved other than a simple blunder or a rational dif-
ference between the parties. We realize that the different treatment accorded
the parties was a result of the organization of the adjudicative system.
The parties received different treatment because (1) the first action
was a part of a larger social controversy, only a fragment of which was
drawn into litigation and adjudged in the first action, (2) another part
of the larger controversy was drawn into litigation at a subsequent point
in time and in a different court, specifically a court of superior hierarchical
authority in the judicial system, and (3) the court of superior hierarchical
authority "found" the law to be different from the finding made by the
court in the first action. This difference in legal premises is the best ex-
14. Id. 26(c)(d).
15. Id. §26 comment e, illustration 6.
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planation for the fact that the litigants in the subsequent litigation were
treated differently from those in the first action.
Given this realization, it becomes clear that the rules of res judicata
are themselves implicated in the different treatment accorded similarly
situated persons. If the ruling in the second action had the effect of set-
ting aside the determination in the first action, then there would have
been no difference in treatment. The first action would simply have been
set aside and a new judgment entered on the basis of the more authoritative
legal premise that emanated from the second adjudication. Moreover, if
the temporal order of the two actions had been reversed, that same result
would have been reached through operation of the rule of stare decisis.
Putting it another way, the first case was decided as it was because
the court did not at the time have access to the more authoritative for-
mulation of the applicable law. The second court did not adopt the rule
formulated in the first case because the second court was not bound to
defer to a formulation that, although earlier in time, emanated from a
court of lesser authority. Nevertheless, although the decision of the first
court is now "wrong," under the basic rule of res judicata that decision
cannot be revised. Such an anomaly in turn invites consideration whether
a decision that is "wrong" for this kind of reason-a reason having to
do with the way the system of adjudication is organized-ought to be denied
the usual finality.
In this connection, it is worth noting that the "error" in the first
decision involved an issue of law. This aspect of the problem is considered
below.
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF ISSUE PRECLUSION
The general rule of issue preclusion prohibits a party who has litigated
an issue from relitigating it. 16 Often the context for attempting relitiga-
tion is another cause of action between the same parties. However, the
context can also be a subsequent aspect of litigation over the same cause
of action, 17 or litigation between the former litigant and a new adversary.18
16. See id. § 27.
17. See id. § 27 comment b. Illustration 3 of comment b provides a good example:
A brings an action against B for personal injuries .... Jurisdiction is asserted
over B, a nonresident, on the basis that the automobile involved in the accident
was being operated in the state by or on his behalf. After trial of this issue, the
action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In a subsequent action by A against
B for the same injuries, brought in the state of B's residence, the prior deter-
mination that the automobile was not being operated by or on behalf of B is
conclusive.
Id. § 27 comment b, illustration 3.
18. See id. § 29. That is, the old "mutuality" rule no longer confines the effect of
issue preclusion to relitigation against the same antagonist. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-33 (1979).
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In all of these contexts, the initial proposition is that a party may not
relitigate an issue that he has litigated previously.
Like the rule of claim preclusion, the rule of issue preclusion is sub-
ject to exceptions.' 9 Most of the exceptions are based on inadequacy of
the opportunity or incentive to have fully litigated the issue in the first
action. 20 There is another set of exceptions, however. As formulated in
Restatement (Second) ofJudgments § 28, in relitigation between the same parties
an exception to the rule of preclusion operates when "[t]he issue is one
of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated,
or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an
intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid
inequitable administration of the laws." ' 21
This exception is expressly limited to issues of law. It operates
primarily when there is some sort of disjunction between the first deter-
mination and the second. For example, a disjunction exists when the tran-
sactions have no connection with each other. As to this situation, the Restate-
ment's comment provides that "the more flexible principle of stare decisis
is sufficient to protect the parties and the court from unnecessary
burdens.' '22 The other disjunction is that of time-the intervention of events
between the two adjudications such that the "applicable legal context"
has undergone change.
Section 28 also allows relitigation to prevent "inequitable administra-
tion of the laws," but it gives this phrase narrow meaning through exam-
ple. The example is illustration 2:
A brings an action against the municipality of B for tortious in-
jury. The court sustains B's defense of sovereign immunity and
dismisses the action. Several years later A brings a second action
against B for an unrelated tortious injury . . . .The judgment
in the first action is not conclusive on the question whether the
defense of sovereign immunity is available to B. 23
Unstated but implied in illustration 2 is the premise that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was well established at the time of the first litigation
but that, by the time of the second action, there was reason to suppose
the highest court of the jurisdiction might overrule the doctrine.
When the second litigation involves different parties, a more liberal
set of exceptions to the rule of issue preclusion is recognized. Again, some
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 28, 29 (1982).
20. See id. § 28(1) (inability to have obtained appellate review in the first action); id.
§ 28(3) (differences in the procedural opportunities for developing the case); id. § 28(4)
(difference in the burden of proof); id. f) 28(5)(a) (problems arising from representative
actions); id. § 28(5)(b), (c) (lack of incentive to litigate fully); id. § 29(2) (differences in
procedural opportunities).
21. Id. § 28(2).
22. Id. § 28 comment b.
23. Id. § 28 comment b, illustration 2.
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of these exceptions involve the opportunity or incentive to litigate in the
first action 24 or estoppel to invoke preclusion. 25 An additional exception
to preclusion rules echoes the theme we have been developing: "The issue
is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately
foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon
which it was based.' '26 Again, this exception reflects the broader institu-
tional concerns of the legal system-equality and stability between the
individual litigants may be sacrificed in order to preserve the equality and
stability of the legal system as a whole.
III. INVALID JUDGMENTS
A last exception to the rules of preclusion arises where the judgment
is treated as a nullity. The rules of preclusion are premised on the rendi-
tion of a valid judgment. As the Restatement puts it: "A valid and final per-
sonal judgment is conclusive between the parties .... ,,27 Judgments that
are invalid don't preclude anything, except when reinforced by something
like estoppel in pais. 28 In effect, therefore, anything that makes a judg-
ment invalid also constitutes an exception to the rules of preclusion.
Putting aside default judgments, which involve special problems of
their own,29 it thus becomes pertinent to consider what makes a judg-
ment invalid. Again using the Restatement's formulation, circumstances
having this effect include those in which "(1) [t]he subject matter of the
action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its entertaining
the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or (2) [a]llowing the judg-
ment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal
or agency of government.' '30
It will be observed that both of these exceptions involve issues of law,
that is, the law defining the authority of the tribunal rendering the judg-
ment. Even so, the rules of issue preclusion normally apply if the ques-
tion of subject matter jurisdiction has been actually litigated. 31 When the
24. See id. § 29(1) (applicable scheme for administering remedies contrary to allowing
issue preclusion); id. § 29(2) (inadequate procedural opportunities); id. § 29(5), (6) (rela-
tionships among the parties different in the two litigations).
25. See id. § 29(3). Another exception withholds preclusion when "the determination
relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with another determination of the same issue."
Id. § 29(4). Thus, the adjudicative system's claim to infallibility will not be recognized
in cases where that claim has been refuted by the system itself.
26. Id. § 29(7).
27. Id. § 17 (emphasis added).
28. See id. § 74 (equitable considerations in determining relief from judgments).
29. See id. § 10 comment b; id. §§ 65-68; id. introductory note to ch. 5, pt. a.
30. Id. § 12. But see id. § 69 (exception to invalid judgment rule when necessary to
protect "justifiable interest of reliance" on judgment).
31. Id. § 12 comment c. Comment c provides in part:
The force of the considerations supporting preclusion is at least as great con-
cerning determinations of the issue of jurisdiction as it is with respect to other
issues .... Beyond this, there is virtually always available a procedure by which
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issue of jurisdiction has not been directly litigated, the problem of the
validity of the judgment and its effect on preclusion takes on additional
dimensions. As stated in comment d to section 12: "The interests primarily
at stake . . .are governmental and societal, not those of the parties.
* . .The question therefore is whether... the tribunal's excess of authority
* . .seriously disturbed the distribution of governmental powers .... ,,32
Comment d again illustrates a situation in which societal and institutional
concerns achieve prominence over individual interests.
IV. EPISTEMOLOGY IN ADJUDICATION OF LEGAL ISSUES
The epistemological grounds for preclusion as to issues of law are
stronger than those for preclusion as to issues of fact. In resolving issues
of fact, the court endeavors to portray for itself a historical transaction
in the outside world of events. Its method is to infer an image of reality-a
scenario-from conflicting evidence. (If the evidence were not in conflict,
there would not be an issue to decide. 33) In deciding fact questions the
court necessarily works through the medium of extrajudicial resources,
for example, evidence from witnesses. That dependency on outside
resources entails a possible discrepancy between what the court believes
was the fact and what actually was the fact. By contrast, in the resolution
of issues of law the court constructs a verbal formulation from materials
of which the court has direct knowledge. These materials include the rele-
vant legal documentary sources, such as precedents and statutes. They
also include the general view of reality in which those verbal materials
take on meaning. Epistemologically, that general view of reality can be
considered an envelope of judicially noticed legislative facts. That reality
is seen and understood through direct judicial perception, not by percep-
tion through the medium of informants, which is how a court apprehends
the facts of a case.34 Of course, different judges have different world views,
which is why they often disagree on what the law is. But these differences
are necessarily dissolved or composed in deciding an issue of law.
When a court retries an issue of fact, it makes the new determina-
tion on a different evidentiary predicate. When it retries an issue of law,
however, it proceeds on the same verbal and circumstantial predicates
to obtain review of the original tribunal's determination of the issue, either by
appeal or by injunction or extraordinary writ.
id.
32. Id. § 12 comment d.
33. See id.
34, The court's understanding of legal issues is arrived at in part by consideration
of arguments submitted by the lawyers for the parties. In this sense, the court is depen-
dent on the parties for its sources of law as well as its sources of fact. However, the court
stands in a position of parity with the lawyers in its ability to examine the sources of law
upon which the lawyers' arguments are based. It does not have such a parity of position
with regard to the facts. Indeed, if the court has significant information about the facts
independent of the evidence that will be presented, that is a ground for disqualification.
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that were involved in the first instance. 35 Purely epistemological considera-
tions offer considerable justification for a judicial change of mind regard-
ing the decision of an issue of fact. They offer none regarding the deci-
sion of an issue of law. Moreover, institutional considerations militate more
strongly against a judicial change of mind about the law as compared to
a change of mind about the facts. In redeciding an issue of fact, the court
can say that its previous decision had been ill-informed. In redeciding
an issue of law, the court must say that its previous decision had been
ill-considered. Yet paradoxically, once determined, an issue of law may
be more easily reopened than an issue of fact.
V. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In this connection it is instructive to consider the historical evolution
of the rules of issue preclusion. The first Restatement ofJudgments made no
provision for res judicata as to issues of law.3 6 Issues of law necessarily
resolved in a judgment were of course given preclusive effect in the par-
ticular cause of action in which they were adjudicated.3 7 However, that
conclusiveness resulted from the rule of res judicata as to the cause of
action-claim preclusion as it is now called.
The first Restatement did not recognize issue preclusion as to issues
of law because there was little or no decisional basis for doing so. Looking
farther back in history, it is possible to surmise why that should have been
so. The original conception of issue preclusion was not res judicata as
to the litigation of an issue; it was estoppel by record. 38 A party to a judicial
proceeding was estopped to controvert the matters in the "record. "39The
matters in the record were those averred by the witnesses or attested by
the jury in its verdict. Estoppel therefore was predicated on what was
averred by the lay participants, not what the court decided. Hence, there
was no legal material that could serve as a predicate for an estoppel.
In addition to this technical barrier, other significant aspects of this
early procedural system inhibited preclusion as to legal issues. For instance,
issues of law and issues of fact were not clearly differentiated in common-
law procedure; 40 a form of action or cause of action was indeed a synthesis
of fact and law. The conception of stare decisis that prevailed until modern
times was another barrier to the preclusion of legal issues. The rule of
precedent bound "the world" for the indefinite future as to legal issues
35. Issues not actually contested do not result in preclusion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment e (1982).
36. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
37. Cf id. § 50 (when personal judgment rendered on ground that complaint is insuf-
ficient as matter of law, that judgment is conclusive as to matters determined).
38. Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to ResJudicata, 35 ILL. L. REV.
41, 51-53 (1940).
39. Id. at 55-56.
40. See generally S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW (1969).
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decided. 41 Such a rule of precedent would make it redundant to hold that
a losing party was also bound by the decision of an issue of law. The
old doctrine of stare decisis did all the work that a preclusion rule could do.
Still another factor was the structure of the adjudicative system itself
prior to the nineteenth century. In that era a given common-law jurisdic-
tion, English or American, had a small number of judges of courts of
record. In the judicial structure generally prevailing before 1800, or even
1825, all judges shared nisi prius responsibilities and together formed the
appellate bench. The standard procedure for resolving important issues
of law arising at nisi prius was to reserve them for later resolution en banc. 42
That procedure involved the whole judiciary of a jurisdiction in the resolu-
tion of such issues. Moreover, if a previously decided legal issue were
to be reopened, the procedure would require the very bench that had de-
cided an issue to redetermine it. A group of judges is not easily persuaded
to do that, nor should it be. This practical psychological obstacle to redeter-
mination of legal issues obviated the question whether there should be
a rule precluding such redeterminations.
VI. MODERN INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES
This historical perspective suggests a framework from which to con-
template preclusion of issues of law in modern context. It seems fair to
suppose that any single modern judge and any single modern appellate
panel would be no readier than their professional predecessors to redecide
legal issues they recently determined. It therefore may be surmised that
if the judicial system were still organized the way it was two centuries
ago, there would be no occasion for a rule precluding relitigation of legal
issues. The normal inclinations of judges would adequately assure stability
of legal decisions.
But the modern judicial system is differently organized. In any given
jurisdiction there are many more judges than there were previously. The
judges are specialized as between trial judges and appellate judges and,
in most jurisdictions, as between judges of a highest court and judges of
intermediate appellate courts. 43 The procedural system provides, because
it must do so as a practical matter, that issues of law normally are to be
adjudicated by the trial judge rather than being referred upward . A legal
41. See generally Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, I J. LEGAL STUDIES 125 (1972)(doctrine of stare decisis analyzed under a modem communications theory). But see generally
G. CALAIRESI, supra note 7, at 4 (citing Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE
L. REV. 1043 (1975)).
42. See R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 38-44 (1941); see also S.
MILSOM, supra note 40, at 70-73.
43. See generally AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'Y, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS,
REPORT No. 20 (1968); LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., supra note 3, table 1, at
11 (1973).
44. Cf. 28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b) (1982) (providing for interlocutory appeal of legal issues
in limited circumstances).
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issue normally reaches an appellate court only by appeal or similar review
of a trial court determination, and normally reaches a supreme court only
by review of a decision by an intermediate appellate court. Thus, under
modern procedure, legal issues usually are adjudicated, subject to the even-
tuality of an appeal, by courts having subordinate positions in the judicial
hierarchy. Indeed, the vast majority of legal issues are decided by such
subordinate courts.
This allocation of authority is justified by compelling reasons of ad-
ministrative expediency. Related reasons of expediency make it desirable
that lower court decisions of law be taken on appeal only when necessary.
Thus, a modern court system needs not only to have legal issues finally
adjudicated by subordinate courts, subject only to appeal, but needs also
to minimize incentives to appeal. If the instant litigation does not justify
an appeal, it follows that a party should not be compelled to appeal simply
in anticipation that the issue may reappear in subsequent litigation in which
the issue will be of greater practical importance.4 5 Correlatively, an ap-
pellate court should not feel impelled to hear an appeal in order to forestall
unjust consequences in possible subsequent litigation, when the issue is
of de minimis importance in the instant litigation or is otherwise unfit
for decision.
A wider perspective of our modern judicial system reveals additional
dimensions of the problem of relitigation or preclusion of legal issues. A
legal issue finally adjudicated in one judicial system may again arise be-
tween the parties in another judicial system. For example, a question of
state law adjudicated in a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction
can subsequently arise in a separate cause of action in state court. By
the same token, a question of federal law adjudicated in a state court can
subsequently arise in a separate cause of action in federal court. A ques-
tion adjudicated in one state can subsequently arise in another state. A
question arising in an administrative agency can subsequently arise in
a proceeding in the courts of the same jurisdiction, or indeed, some other
jurisdiction. And too, in all these cases the tribunal that has final case-
adjudicating authority does not have final law-pronouncing authority.
Another dimension of this multiple forum difficulty is presented where
a legal issue has been resolved by one division of an intermediate appellate
court system and then arises in a subsequent case between the parties in
another division of the system.4 6 The second bench may allow the losing
party to relitigate; if not, its authority would be preempted by the earlier
decision of a court of coordinate authority.
Indeed, under the logic of an unqualified issue preclusion rule, the
decision of a legal issue at any level of an adjudicative system would preempt
reconsideration of that issue by any other tribunal in litigation by either
45. See generally 1B J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.402[1]-[3] (2d ed. 1983).
46. See Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1045-50 (2d Cir. 1974).
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of the parties. Such a restriction on the authority of higher courts in develop-
ment of the law is a serious matter of institutional arrangement. It is
especially serious with regard to legal issues of general public importance.
This brings into view the situation in which the rule of issue preclu-
sion is likely to have its greatest practical importance: litigation involving
a public agency. Under the mutuality rule, preclusion applied only where
both parties were involved in the prior litigation. With the rejection of
the mutuality rule, however, a party who has lost an issue against an adver-
sary in a prior litigation ordinarily is also bound as against other adver-
saries. With certain qualifications, this is a proper rule for issues of fact.
With certain further qualifications, it is a proper rule for issues of law
as between private parties. That is, no untoward consequences befall the
administration of the law when preclusion is applied in such circumstances,
and gains of equality and stability are realized. But when the party in-
volved is a frequent litigant, and the litigation frequently involves legal
questions of general public importance, other considerations become more
significant.
A public agency is quintessentially if not uniquely such a party.
4 7
Decisions of law in cases involving such frequent litigants generally have
significance beyond their immediate impact. Indeed, the chief significance
of such decisions is their effect beyond the immediate parties. Therefore,
the refusal to reconsider such issues can result in "inequitable administra-
tion of the laws," to use the Restatement's phrase. 48 Hence, it would seem
that the rule of issue preclusion prima facie should be inapplicable in such
cases. A "repeat" litigant, particularly the government, ordinarily should
be free to relitigate a legal issue in subsequent litigation that could result
in an appeal to a higher level of authority in the legal system.
The first of recent Supreme Court cases dealing with whether issue
preclusion should bar relitigation of legal issues of such "general public
importance" did not take the above approach. Montana v. United States
49
held that the government could not relitigate a legal issue unless it could
show that "the factual and legal context ... has.., materially altered.' '50
Nonetheless, the result in the Montana case surely was correct. In Mon-
tana the government had brought the second action in the same controversy
solely for the purpose of clearing a path for relitigation of the legal issue.
That kind of gaming clearly ought not to be permitted. 51 However, the
ground of estoppel in Montana should have been the illegitimacy of the
attempted litigation stratagem. But for the fact that the government had
47. It should be noted that a public utility company may be another example of a
frequent litigant whose contested issues are of considerable public importance.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2) (1982).
49. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
50. Id. at 162.
51. Cf. Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 400-01 (1981) (court found
"no injustice" in applying res judicata because of party's questionable motives).
HeinOnline -- 70 Iowa L. Rev. 92 1984-1985
ISSUES OF LAW
been gaming, the legal question at issue should have been open for deci-
sion by a higher court even though it had already been decided below
in a previous case in which the government had been involved. After all,
considering the interests of those other than the immediate litigants, higher
courts exist essentially for that purpose of review.
In an interesting pair of recent decisions, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the vitality of issue preclusion in cases involving the government.
In United States v. Mendoza52 the Court took one step along the line of
analysis that would permit relitigation of such legal issues. It refused,
however, to take a further step in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company.5 3
In Mendoza the Court allowed the government to relitigate an issue of law
which it had lost in an earlier, factually separate case. However, the Court
limited the opportunity for relitigating to situations in which offensive use
of preclusion had been invoked against the government: "We hold,
therefore, that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel simply does not apply
against the government in such a way as to preclude relitigation of issues
such as those involved in this case. ' 54
On the other hand, in Stauffer the Court held that defensive preclu-
sion applied in favor of the identical private party who had prevailed against
the government in a prior suit based on essentially similar facts.5 5 The
Court noted, however, that applying the preclusion rule in the particular
context would not significantly embarrass the government's ability to
relitigate the legal issue against some other party:
[T]he government itself asserts that "thousands of businesses
are affected each year by the question of contractor participa-
tion in Section 114 inspections." . . . It is thus unrealistic to
assume that the government would be driven to pursue an un-
warranted appeal here because of fear of being unable to relitigate
the § 114 issue in the future with a different one of those thousands
of affected parties. 56
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in Stauffer thus does not much restrict the government's
autonomy to relitigate legal issues of general public importance. Indeed,
the factual connection between the two actions in Stauffer was so substan-
tial that the two litigations could have been regarded as involving the same
cause of action; based on that analysis, the problem is one of claim preclu-
sion rather than issue preclusion. Surely the government should not be
allowed to relitigate a legal issue against the same opponent in substan-
tially contemporaneous litigation involving closely related facts. That situa-
52. 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).
53. 104 S. Ct. 575 (1984).
54. 104 S. Ct. at 574.
55. 104 S. Ct. at 578.
56. Id. at 580 n.6.
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tion aside, it would seem that, as a general proposition, the government
now is not precluded from relitigating issues of law. Given the larger in-
stitutional interests at stake-the concern for equality and stability as viewed
from the perspective of the legal system as a whole rather than from the
viewpoint of the individual participants-that position seems correct.
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